We may be moving toward an endgame in the war in Ukraine in which the United States, and President Trump in particular, emerge as the broker that all sides need. Europe can keep Ukraine fighting for now, but it cannot fully replace American military resources, maintain public support for a prolonged war across many different countries, or negotiate a settlement with Russia. Russia, meanwhile, may continue advancing on the battlefield, but that alone cannot secure political recognition of the gains or normalized trade relations with the West. Trump could therefore present himself as the only leader able to end the war while using the settlement to advance his own interest, especially solidifying his political influence in the USA and Europe.
Two recent decisions by the Trump administration may reveal a lot more about the future of the Ukraine war, than cited public statements.
The first concerns $400 million that Congress approved for Ukrainian military assistance. The Pentagon informed Congress that the money would be placed under contract during fiscal year 2026, but that final delivery might not occur until September 2029. As of late July 2026, the money had reportedly not been spent or even formally placed under contract. Members of both parties described the schedule as unusually slow for a country fighting an active war.
The second decision concerns Patriot missile interceptors. During a July meeting with Zelensky during the NATO summit, Trump said that he intended to allow Ukraine to manufacture Patriot missiles under licence. Ukraine requested these missiles because Patriot is its only reliable defence against Russian ballistic missiles. Zelensky rather hoped for priority delivery of missiles, as licensed production would incur substantial delay (up to two year delay in the optimistic scenario, per “Lviv Herald”).
Yet on July 31, Trump withdrew even from this commitment. He said that no agreement had been made and that the United States had to be careful because countries receiving such technology “can someday turn on you.”
These events do not prove that Trump wants Ukraine to lose, yet the two decisions point in the same direction. His administration is making statements that sound supportive while refusing the military capacity requested by Ukraine on short notice..
This distinction matters a lot. A promise to deliver equipment by 2029 does little to stop Russian attacks in 2026. A promise to discuss Patriot production does not protect Ukrainian airspace, especially it does not protect it right now.
The question is therefore whether delay itself serves a political purpose.
A changing argument inside Trump’s movement
A large part of Trump’s political movement no longer describes Ukraine as an innocent ally that must be supported until Russia is defeated, but rather as a result of corruption and recklessness of American authorities under Biden and Obama, intelligence agencies and Ivy League foreign policy intelligentsia.
One such view (gaining substantial traction in MAGA circles) came from Peter Blaber in an April 2026 interview on the Shawn Ryan Show. Blaber is a retired colonel who commanded Delta Force special operations and also an author and advisor on “common sense leadership”. In his book he called out various blunders of United States higher command, which adds to his authority, especially among those who distrust the Washington establishment.
Blaber told Ryan that “a bunch of Ivy League, State Department, CIA people concocted” the Ukraine conflict through “senseless decision after senseless decision.” He accused senior American officials of helping remove Ukraine’s government in 2014 and sparking conflict in eastern Ukraine with use of nationalist extremists. He also claimed that Western governments had encouraged Ukraine to continue a war it could not win.
Several of Blaber’s historical claims are contested or exaggerated, yet the political importance of the interview does not depend on every claim being correct. Its importance lies in the story it offers to Trump’s supporters.
In this story, American officials interfered in Ukraine, ignored Russian warnings, encouraged Kyiv to reject compromise and then promised support that they were unwilling or unable to provide. Ukraine becomes the victim of American officials as much as of Russia. Trump becomes the only president willing to stop the process.
This is changing the assignment of responsibility. Russia might remain factually “the country that invaded Ukraine in 2022”, but responsibility for producing the wider conflict is shifted toward the Obama/Biden administration, the State Department, the CIA, European governments, and Ukrainian nationalist extremists.
That account would become politically useful if Ukraine suffered a major military reverse.
Why Ukrainian weakness could help Trump
A critical Ukrainian position would create serious risks for Trump, but it could also give him a powerful argument against his domestic opponents.
Trump could say that Democrats and traditional Republican interventionists created an impossible problem, with destabilization and false promises made to Ukraine. He could say that only he remained able to negotiate with Vladimir Putin, presenting himself as the person who must settle a disaster made by others.
The timing of the two recent decisions supports this interpretation more than either decision would alone. Congress approved assistance, but delivery is stretched beyond Trump’s term. Trump announced support for Patriot production, then withdrew from the promise within weeks. Thus, they preserve the appearance of support while reducing its immediate value.
It is profoundly important if we remember how Trump’s relationship with Zelensky soured in 2025. Trump promised his voters to sort out the Ukrainian Crisis, boasting that he would do it in a few months and collect the Nobel peace prize. His blueprint for a deal was the following: Zelensky has no options, here is the best offramp he can get, so he needs to “take it or take it”.
Zelensky and his European partners disagreed, thinking that they could manage prolonged war and achieve partial strategic victory.
Year after, European partners are forced to ask Trump for help, which is one of few lines of evidence that it does not work well, as Trump has predicted. Democrats and Europeans are then trapped by their own narrative and promises of Ukrainian victory.
Trump’s strategy resembles checking in poker. In 2025 Europeans concluded they do not need unreliable Trump anymore. Trump concluded that then it is all good and he can withdraw as he promised. Now if the frontline situation is so good, then Ukraine can manage without Patriot missiles (and Trump is still not responsible for anything).
Why Putin Would Still Need the United States.
Russia does not need Trump’s permission to continue fighting, but battlefield gains alone cannot give Russia everything it wants, and certainly not in a cost-effective way.
Four years of war had imposedsubstantial costs on Russia: perhaps hundreds of thousands military deaths, costs (estimations vary, up to trillions of dollars if projected GDP loss is included). Russia is advancing on the front, but becoming weaker long-term, which may make it seek settlement, once enough territory is captured.
This suggests that Putin’s preferred outcome may not be endless war. Russia can seek one further period of military pressure, gain a stronger position and then convert those gains into a settlement that Washington helps to enforce.
The Kremlin has therefore continued to treat Trump as its preferred Western negotiating partner. On July 24, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia would continue fighting but would wait for new American proposals. He described Trump and his negotiators as sincere and blamed European governments for encouraging Ukraine to resist earlier proposals.
Why, however, would Putin still need Trump? So far, the war resulted in a stalemate, with weak Russian initiative showing up in summer 2026 and expected to accelerate somewhat with Ukrainian manpower shortages. But even if these offensives resulted in a staggering success, (let’s assume for the sake of argument) and Ukrainian Army would be decisively routed, even that is not yet automatically a solution that Putin might want. European partners could still provide Ukraine with ammo, drones and satellite intel, strikes on refineries could continue, and sanctions could remain in place. Furthermore, assaulting major natural obstacles, like Dnieper, is made more difficult for the attacker. Now there is a 15 or 25 km deep drone-killzone, in which troops move on foot in small groups, relying on fog or rain for cover. Heavy concentrations of forces and engineering preparation would be quickly discovered by drone or satellite surveillance and bombed.
This could take another 2 to 4 years, during which Western Europe would keep expanding its military production capabilities. The real question is geopolitical: would Western Europe want or be able to do it, sacrificing much more than it does now, and in what shape it would be in the end and whether its population would play along with it.
The Exposed Position of Europe’s Liberal Governments.
Western Europe endures a substantial economic and political crisis and this adds greatly to Trump leverage. He controls many important wartime assets like intelligence, missile systems, Starlink and similar assets. More importantly, the US government commands great political influence in Europe, through a network of allies who seek its security guarantees (like Nawrocki in Poland), and through American media platforms,online platforms such as Facebook and X, as well as traditional television networks. Both of these assets Trump has fiercely protected, protesting taxation of social media platforms, and preferring direct control over security alliances over NATO commitment.
The most important source of Trump influence is through conservative European parties who want him to help rid Europe of the globalist left.
And it is important because it strictly parallels Trump’s main interest to powerfully undermine his own domestic opposition, Democrats and Neocons, solidify his legacy and mint a new like-minded president for 2029.
What Trump needs is best illustrated by Blaber’s podcast: exposing worst deeds of the Biden/Obama administration at once: such as scheming to stage a putsch, start a war, derail peace processes, sponsoring nationalist extremists with WW2-era toxic ideologies and orchestrating a multibillion defraudation of taxpayer’s money.
To have a chance to do that, however, a powerful catalyst is needed. In 2025-2026, various corrupt Biden-era officials were grilled by the Congress over USAID corruption, COVID injections, Epstein affair and similar, and MAGA media followed. All this produced little immediate effect, and the Trump administration could not afford moving more forcefully without losing its congressional majority or support of the establishment
With a) urgent crisis caused by Russia’s rapid advance b) Blaber-style media stories about “Nazi coup” and killings of Russians in Donbas – all this becomes much different. Crisis (a) makes story (b) self-reinforcing, because Western countries’ politicians need an offramp that will make the Ukrainian Crisis not their problem. Story (b) will make crisis (a) very difficult to manage, especially without Trump consent, because European liberals’ efforts to mobilize military assets and use someone else like Poland to do the ground fighting will be stalled by opposition screaming “You orchestrated it, it’s your problem not ours”. In the USA, in the meantime, Democrats and Neocons can easily ally to shut down the government and cause some kind of riots and obstructions to pressure Trump. The problem is that obstructions work only when your opponent is in a state of urgency. With (a) and (b) it is Trump who will have lots of time to wait and do nothing, while they will see their political stake destroyed in a matter of weeks, and only get more blame for it after.
All this is only a hypothesis or a possibility without direct evidence, so let us focus briefly on what else we know. Indeed there seem to be some more clues supporting this outcome.
The biggest argument is found in the 28-point peace plan that the USA presented in 2025. There we read “All Nazi ideology and activities must be rejected and prohibited “ which parallels Putin’s demand to “denazify” Ukraine. This would allow him (once said agreement were in power) to demand Ukraine to dismantle public veneration of Nazi-related criminals like Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, revise school programs (regarding especially favourable depiction of mentioned figures) and disband Nazi-influenced military units like Azov.
European liberals and Democrats have a relevant problem here. They cannot accept this point of course, but neither can they disagree with it openly (official line is that there is no Nazism in Ukraine). Moreover, Azov-like formations are unlikely to agree to be disarmed or to accept ideological concessions (they were known to threaten Zelensky before), especially considering the fact they are powerful like never before (now Azov is an army corps, with access to a variety of advanced weapons and up to 50,000 people).
We can also mention following:
At the August 15, 2025 Anchorage summit, Trump and Putin held nearly three hours of closed talks. They announced no agreement, although Putin later referred to unspecified ‘understandings’ reached there, suggesting there was some higher level agreement for post-war political structure. Trump’s casual suggestions that “Russia and the USA share a common history of defeating Nazism”, or about hypothetical projects like building a tunnel from Russia to Alaska.
- More balanced or somewhat anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, especially after a backlash to a scandal in which Zelensky honored a WW2-era Nazi-related unit that massacred Poles. PiS (commonly thought to be influenced by the USA in large part) supported Ukraine before very strongly, but now prime minister candidate Czarnek condemned Zelensky harshly and called for stopping aid to Ukraine. Fringe figures like Grzegorz Braun and KKP are getting social media reach on American platforms like Facebook. Amazon Prime promotion of documentary about Ukrainian Nazi genocide of Poles, “The Neighbours” by nationalist filmmaker Jacek Międlar.
- Similar sentiment in other European countries, highlighting the need to make a deal with Russia and some point, together with the rejection of Nazi symbolism or organizations . French nationalists booing Zelensky and Ukrainian troops on the Bastille Day parade (nationalist politician F. Philippot describing them as “linked to extremist and even neo-Nazi elements”). Bart De Wever, the prime minister of Belgium, and Peter Magyar, the prime minister of Hungary, both called to normalize trade relations with Russia, especially increasing imports of fuels, that continue to this day.
References
Blaber, Pete. Interview by Shawn Ryan. “Pete Blaber—Part 1: Delta Force Commander on Roberts Ridge: The Battle of Takur Ghar.” The Shawn Ryan Show, April 6, 2026. Transcript.
Holland, Steve, and Simon Lewis. “Trump Says US Has Not Agreed to Ukraine Building Patriot Missiles.” Reuters, July 31, 2026. Article.
Reuters. “Russia Says It Will Wait for New Trump Proposals on Ending Ukraine War.” July 24, 2026. Article.
Reuters. “Trump’s Push to End Ukraine War Raises Fears of ‘Ugly Deal’ for Europe.” December 2, 2025. Article.
Zengerle, Patricia. “Pentagon Says It Will Not Finish Spending Ukraine Funds Until Year Trump Leaves Office, Source Says.” Reuters, July 27, 2026. Article.
CSIS. “Russian Blood and Treasure: The Ballooning Costs of Putin’s War.” 2026.
NATO. “Mark Rutte: Secretary General.” 2026.
NATO. “NATO Secretary General.” 2026.
OSW. “Forging a Nationalist Model Army: The Political Prospects of Azov.” 2026.
Reuters. “Draft of US-Backed Peace Proposal for Ukraine.” 2025.
Reuters. “Trump-Putin Summit Yields No Deal on Ending War in Ukraine.” 2025.
Reuters. “Life after Orbán: Hungary Inc Digs In as New Political Era Takes Hold.” 2026.
Munch, Paul. “Tactical River Crossings: Is It Time to Reconsider the Current Doctrine’s Tactics and Procedures?” Military Review, 2026.
Reuters. “Inside Ukraine’s Kill Zone.” July 2026.
Levytska, Iryna. “Kill Zone on Both Sides of Front Line Reaches 25 km, Says Ukraine’s Drone Commander.” Ukrainska Pravda, May 14, 2026.
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